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SPECIAL REPORT

tax notes''
The Anti-Injunction Act and
The Individual Mandate
By Steve R. Johnson
Steve R. Johnson is a professor a t Florida State Univers ity College o f L1w. He
wo uld like to tha nk his colleague Je ffrey Kahn for his
co mments. The a uth o r can
be reached at s johnson@law.
fs u.ed u.
The Supreme Court wi ll
soon hea r cha lle nges to the
Sieve R. Johnson
constitutionality of the individual mandate of the hea lthcare reform legis lation.
It is im portant tha t thi s pi vota l case be dec ided on
the me rits. However, it is possible that a closely
div ided court may hold that the Anti- Injunctio n Act
and the Decla ra to ry Judg me nt Act preclude s ubs tantive review.
Jo hnson urges Congress to e liminate that threat
by amending the acts so tha t they do no t a ppl y to
the litiga ti on . Th e amendment s hould be simple,
q uick, a nd uncontrovers ia l, w hich would a llow it to
decisively remove the possibi li ty that resolu tion of
the national controversy wo uld be d era iled o n
procedura l g rounds.
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The Supre m e Court w ill soon cons ider challe nges to Lhe cons litu tio nd lity of the so-called individ uol m a ndate portion of the Patient Pro tection
c11ld Affo rd able C He !\ct of 2010 ( PPACJ\). 1 It is
importa nt for the natio n that the Court render n
dec is io n on the n1erits. T his could be derai led,
however, we re th e Cour t to di spose of the case by
holding th<tt the A nti - Injunction Act (J\ IJ\)2 ilnd the
DeclMato ry Judgment !\ct (DJJ\):l preclude p rec nfo rcement review. Dispos itio n o n those grounds
wou ld s ubject the fed era l governme n t, states, businesses, a nd individu ,1 ls to years of ad di tio nal uncertilinty, inconven ience, an d expense.
Fortunately, tha l threa t to resolution on the merils ca n be eilsil y a nd ex peditious ly removed. This
report urges Cong ress to ilmend the !\IA and the
DJ!\ to provide Lhat they do not ap ply to, o r prevent
p re-enfo rcem en t judiciill rev iew of, s uits chil ll enging the cons titu tio na lit y o f the ind ividua l mandate.
T ha l cou ld be do ne ra pid ly and simply. Because
bolh s up po rters ci nd opponents of the ind ividur1 1
m il nda te now filvo r on-the-m e rits Supre me Court
review, the re s hou ld be li ttle or no political cont roversy as to e nactment o f Lhe amendments. Moreove r, Lhe a m e ndme nts wo u ld not req ui re e labora te
drafting - two sentences of langu age (one each fo r
the J\ IJ\ a nd the DJ!\) wou ld s u ffice.
Parts I ,ind II of this report provide bnckground.
Pi1 rt I d escri bes Lhe indi v idua l mandnte, cha lle nges
thilt have been made rl'gilrding the va lid ity of the
1111indate, a nd the rl'su lts of litigation to date. Pa rt II
descri bes the J\ IJ\ a nd DJ!\ a nd recou nts mg uments
,1d va ncecl ils to the ir .1pp lici1bi lily or inap p licability
to the indi v idual milntfate contex t.
Pmt Ill ex pla ins the need fo r amendment of the
J\ IJ\ a nd the DJ!\. It notes tha t there is a genuine
possibi lity th at the Court 1m 1y hold that the 11cts
p recl ude prc-t'nforn'ment rev iew o f the cons titutionality of Lhe indi vidua l 1m111d,1tc clnd th,1t this
oulcome wo uld h;um the country. Disposing of the
cases on J\ IJ\ cllld DJ!\ grounds wo uld d elay fo r
yt'il rs on- the- m e r its reso lution of the lega Ii ty of the
individua l mandate . That de lay would protrnct ou r

1

1'. L. 111 - 1-18 (2lllll). T he veh icle by w h ich the Court wi ll
the ch;i lh.:nges is /'/o ridu v. Ot'f1/. of I leuf//J fr /-/111111111
~.·m, 6-18 F.'.k l 1215 ( 11th Ci r. 20 11 ). Doc 20 11-1 7561 , 2011 TNT
158- 1-1, rt'rl. sr1111ii'd, 80 U.S.L.W. 3 198 ;ind 3199 (Nnv. 1..J, 20 1!).
co n ~ ider

2

Sl!clio n 742 1.
28 U .S.C. ~eel ion 220 1.

1
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agony of uncertainty about what our national
health policy will be, and it would create great
practical difficulties for the federal government,
state governments, businesses, and individuals.
That is an unacceptable risk given how easily the
risk could be obviated by short, simple, and uncontroversial amendments to the AIA and OJA.
Part IV addresses how to effect those statutory
amendments. It considers, and rejects, possible objections to statutory amendment.
I. Background
The wisdom and the legality of the PPACA an.'
among the most important political and legal issues
on the contemporary scene. With some exceptions,
the individual mandate provision of the act requires
all individuals to obtain "minimum essential [medical insurance] coverage" for each month. 4 Those
who fail to do so must include with their annual
federal income tax payment a "shared responsibility payment." This is denominated as a "penalty"
by the act. 5 The amount of the penalty cannot
exceed $3,000 for 2014, the first year for which the
provision will be effective."
Both supporters and opponents of the PPACA
recognize the centrality of the individual mandate
to the act. Congress found that "the requirement is
an essential part of this larger regulation of economic activity." 7 Congress believed that without the
individual mandate, many individuals would wait
to buy insurance until they needed care, exacerbating problems in medical care delivery and finance.tl
Were the individual mandate removed, the viability
of the entire act would be in question. 9
The individual mandate is highly controversial.
Critics have assailed it as being beyond the authority of Congress, an unconstitutional assertion of
power. States, businesses, and individuals have
initiated numerous suits contesting the provisions'
validity. The decided cases have not always reached
the merits, being decided instead on jurisdictional
or prudential grounds, such as lack of standing or
lack of ripeness. 10

When the courts have reached the merits, they
have faced an array of arguments against the individual mandate and other provisions of the
PPACA. 11 The two principal battlegrounds are
whether enactment of the provisions was within the
authority of Congress under the commerce clause 12
or under the taxing and spending clauseD of tht>
Constitution.
Thus far, four federal circuit courts have issued
on-the-merits decisions in cases involving challenges to the individual mandate. On Jum• 29 a
divided panel of tlw Sixth Circuit in Thomas More
concluded that the individual mandate cannot bt.•
sustained under Congress's taxing power but thClt il
is facially constitutional under the commercc•
clause. 14 On August 12 a divided panel of tlw
Eleventh Circuit held that the individual mandate
cannot be upheld under either the commerce clause
or the taxing and spending clause. 15 On September
8 a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit held that th<.•
AIA bars pre-enforcement challenge to the individual mandate. 1" On November 8 a divided panel

PPACA, section 1501, codified at section SOOOA.
!iSection SOOOA(b ).
6
The details of the individual mandate are described in
Jeffrey H. Kahn, "The Operation of the Individual Mandate,"
Tax Noles, Aug. 1, 2011, p. 521, Doc 2011-14545, 2011 TNT 148-4.
7
42 U.S.C. section 18091(a)(2)(H).
8
/d. at section 18091 (a)(2)(1) and (F).
9
"Congress found that the !individual mandate} provision is
an essential cog in the Affordable Care Act's comprehensive
scheme to reform the national markets in health care delivery
and health insurance." Thomas More l.ilw Cmter v. Obama, 651
F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-14236, 2011 TNT 126-9.
10
£.g., Virginia v. St'l1L'li11s, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), Doc
2011-19032, 2011 TNT 175-13; Baldwi11 v. Sebelius, 654 F.3d 877

(9th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-17540, 2011 TNT 157-15; Nl'w /mw11
Pllysicians luc. v. Preside11l of Ille United States, 653 F.3d 234 (3~i
Cir. 2011); Butler v. Olmma, 2011 WL 4526079 (E.D.N.Y. 2011);
Pt!lerso11 l1. Unill'd Sia/es, 774 F. Supp.2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011); Kimil'r
t>. Gl'itlmer, 2011 WL 1576721 (E.D. Mo. 2011).
11
The less frequent attacks have involved contentions thilt
the provisions traduce the 10th Amendment; contravene the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act; constitute an unapportioned direct tax on employers; interfere with state sovereignty
and inhibit the states' performance of their govemmental functions; represent improper commandeering of state resource~ by
the federal government; and violate the establishment, free
exercise, equal protection, free speech, and necessary and
proper clauses of the Constitution. In one "kitchen sink" complaint, the plaintiffs included claims that the PPACA infringes
on First Amendment freedom of association rights; Fifth
Amendment due process liberty rights; Ninth Amendment
privacy rights; and "rights emanating from the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments" as to confidentiality of
medical information. U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sel1eli11s, 754 F. Supp.
2d 903, 905 (N.D. Ohio 2011).
12
U.S. Const., Art. I, section 8, cl. 3.
nu.s. Const., Art. I, section 8, cl. 1.
14
Tlwmas More, 651 F.3d 529, ~ffg 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D.
Mich. 2010), Doc 2010-22007, 2010 TNT 196-15.
ir;Florida v. DcJ''I of Hmltlt [.,.Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th
Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-17561, 2011TNT158-14, aff'g in part fr m•'g
in part 780 F. Supp.2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), Doc 2011-2175, 2011
TNT 21-8, c/ar~fied l1y 780 F. Supp.2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), Doc
2011-4650, 2011 TNT 44-18 (holding the individual mandate
unconstitutional). However, the court held that the individual
mandate is severable such that its invalidity does not requirl'
invalidating the entire PPACA.
l<·ut1at11 Univ. /11c. v. Gdtl1m·r, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir.
2011), Doc.2011-19031, 2011 TNT 175-12, vacating a11d remanding
753.f. Supp.2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010), Doc 2010-25502, 2010 TNT
231-12 (holding the individual mandate constitutional). On the
same day, the Fourth Circuit rejt.>cted on standing grounds a suit
brought by Virginia against the individual mandate. Virginia v.

(Footnote continued in next column.)

(Footnote continued on nexl page.)
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of the D.C. Circuit held that the AIA does not bar
pre-enforcement review and that enacting the individual mandate was within the power of Congress
under the commerce clause.17
The main two reasons the Supreme Court grants
certiorari - the importance of the case and the
existence of a split among circuits - both are
present. 18 Given that, and given that the United
States as well as other parties have requested review, it was not a surprise that the Supreme Court
agreed to hear the matter. Oral argument is scheduled for March 2012.
II. Threat to On-the-Merits Decision
The parties challenging the individual mandate
typically seek both declaratory and injunctive relief:
a judicial declaration that the provision is unconstitutional and an injunction against implementation
and enforcement of the mandate by the federal
government. The OJA and the AIA imperil the
ability of the courts to grant that relief. 14 The
subparts below describe those two statutes and
summarize the divergent views that have been
articulated thus far as to their applicability to the
individual mandate.
A. Anti-Injunction Act
The earliest version of the AIA was enacted in
1857.20 The current version provides, in general,
that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not
such person is the person against whom such tax
was assessed." 21 The act reflects the realization that
"taxes are the life-blood of government, and their
prompt and certain availability an imperious

Sd11'fi11~, 656 F.1d 251, P11cati11g 1111d rcm1111di11s 728 E Supp.2d 768
(E.D. Va. 2010), Doc 20/0-26522, 20]() TNT 239-8 (holding the
individual mandate unconstitutional).
17
S1•v1•11-Sk1/ l'. Holder, 2011 WL 5378319 (D.C. Cir. 2011 ), Doc
2011-23522, 2tJll TNT 217-19.
18
S1•e, 1'.s., Petition for Writ of Certiornri of the United Stntl'S,
II/IS v. /'lorida, 2010 WL 7634114, at 29-12 (Sept. 28, 2010)
(describing the circuit split nnd identifying the issue ns "n
qul•stion of fundamental importance").
11
' The AJA ilnd the DJA also hm·e loomed large in another
current tax controversy: rL•medies for thl• IRS's overcharging of
commtmirntions excise tnxes. S1•1•, l'.g., Colll'll l'. Uuit1•d States, h50
F3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (eu '11111c), Doc 2011-14478, 20rl PNT
128-14; Steve R. Johnson, "Colle11: Hard Cases Makes (Semi) [fad
Law," 31 ABA S1•ctio11 of '/il.'\:'11 News Q1111rterli1 12 (fall 2011).
211
Another fedeml s·tatute also is called the AIA: 28 U.S.C.
section 2283. That other statute deals with federal courts enjoining state court proceedings. That other statute is not the subject
of this report. for discussion of the other AJA, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, frdera/ /urisdictivn 735-753 (2007).
:!'Section 7421(a).
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need." 22 Accordingly, the act's principal purpose is
"the protection of the Government's need to assess
and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a
minimum of pre-enforcement judicial interference."23
There are more than a dozen enumerated statutory exceptions to the above prohibition, but none
of them applies to the situation at hand. Also, there
are two judicially created exceptions. First, under
Williams Packing, suit may be brought, notwithstanding the J\IA, if the plaintiff establishes both
that under the most liberal view of the law and the
facts, it is clear the government cannot prevail on
the merits of the dispute and that the plaintiff faces
irreparable harm for which no adequate remedy at
law exists. 24 Second, under Soutlz C11roli11a, suit may
be maintained if Congress has failed to provide an
allegedly aggrieved party a legal avenue by which
to contest the legality of the tax in question.25
As its text makes clear, the AIA precludes courts
from hearing only those cases that arc brought to
restrain assessment or collection of a federal "tax."2°
A central substantive issue in the individual mandate cases is whether the mandate is proper as a
"tax" under the taxing and spending clause. At first
blush one might think that if the challengers prevail
in their contention that the mandate does not involve a tax under that clause, they necessarily also
will escape prohibition of their suit under the AIA.
That is not necessarily so, however, because the
word "tax" need not have the same meaning for
constitutional purposes as for statutory purposes. 27
This fact is illustrated by a pair of cases decided
on the same day by the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs in the two rnses had been subjected to exactions, dt.'nominated as taxes, under a child labor

22
811/I u. U11ili'd Stall's, 295 U.S. 2-17 ( 1935); ~l't' also Edmund
Burke, Reflcctio11s au I/rt' /~1'vol11liotr i11 Frmrce ("The revenue of the
st<l te is the sta tc" ).
21
Ho/J /011t's U11iv. l'. Simou, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1lJ74) (punctuation omitted); ~1'1' 11/so Milla l'. Sla11d11rd N11t Margarine Co., 284
U.S. 498, 5119 ( ll132).
:!. 1 E11odr~ l'. William~ f>t1l'ki11g fr Nal'ig11lio11 Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1%2).
:?r:.So11tlr Carolina u. lfrsmr, -th5 U.S. 367, 373 ( 1984).
2
''Whether i1 particular exaction should be characterized as a
tax or as Sllll"lething else matters for, and has been controversiill
in, mnny contexts, including tax Vl•rsus penalty or other punishnwnt, t'.g., Watas u. ftlrr, 291 S.W.Jd 873 (Tenn. 2009), Dor
2009-17530, <"Ind tax versus fee, t'.g., Vl'ltfas Finance I LLC l'.
Fm11drise 'fo.r Bd., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823 (Cal. App. 2008), cat.
tlc11ied, 129 S. Ct. 1917 (2004), Doc 2008-17560; Nortlrwest E11ergl'lic
Sav. LLC u. Fri111dris1• Tirx Bd., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642 (Cal. App.
2008), Doc 2008-2188.
27
But s1•1• Florida l'. HHS, 716 F. Supp.2d 1120, 1130-1131 (N.D.
Fla. 2010), Doc 2010-22392, 2010 TNT 199-7 (seeming to suggest
that the statutory and constitutional definitions of tax ilre
essentially the same), affd in part and rev'd in J1tlrl, 648 F.3d 1235
(11th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-17561, 2011TNT158-14.
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statute. In one case the plaintiff brought suit to
restrain assessment of the exaction. The Supreme
Court held that the exaction was a tax within th«:>
intendment of the predecessor of the AIA, which
barred the suit. 28 The companion case, however,
involved a post-payment refund suit, not a preassessment action. Thus, it was not barred by the
predecessor of the AIA. Reaching the merits, the
Court held that the exaction was not a tax for
constitutional purposes and so was invalid. 2"
B. Declaratory Judgment Act
The AIA may be problematic for tlw injunctive
relief sought by plaintiffs chalJenging the individuaJ
mandate. The OJA may b(' problematic for the
dedaratory relief sought by those plaintiffs. TJu"'
OJA withdraws authority from fedt.'ral courts to
grant declaratory relief in tax cases.:111 The courts
typicalJy hold that the AIA and the OJA arc cocxtensive.·11 Accordingly, if the former precludes injunctive relief in a given case, the latter precludes
declaratory relief in the same case.
As a result, courts usually refer only to the AJA,
mentioning the OJA only briefly or not at all. The
remainder of this report will follow that approach
and will describe the issue whether the two acts
preclude pre-enforcement review of the constitutionality of the individual mandate as "the AJA
issue."
C. Divergent Views on the AIA Issue
Some of the cases do not address the AJA issue.
In other cases, however, the Justice Department
raised the issue.J2 Below are set out some of the
developments. For the most part, I avoid detailed
descriptions of the parties' arguments and focus
instead on the holdings reached.
A federal district court considered the AIA issue
in Goudy-Bachman in January. The government
maintained that the penalty for failing to maintain
minimum insurance coverage is a tax for AIA
purposes because the PPACA provides that it is to
be "assessed and collected in the sanw manner as

2

"Bail1·y ''· George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922).
'>811ik11 v. Drl'xcl Fumiture Co., 25Y U.S. 2ll (llJ22). The Court

2

held that the measure was not a tax, because it was intended not
to raise revenue but to coerce employers to comply with child
labor regulations.
:l028 U.S.C. section 2201(a). The lower federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction. They have only thl' powers and
jurisdiction that Congress chooses to confer on them. E.g.,
Kokk1m1•11 ''· Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
:t•co/w11, 650 F.Jd at 727-731; Sigmo11 Coal Co. v. A1~fl'I, 226 F.3d
291, 299 (4th Cir. 2000); 111 rt' Lc•ckit· Smokl'less Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573,
583 (4th Cir. 1996).
32
As seen below, the DOJ has since abandoned the position
that the AIA bars pre-enforcement review of the constitutionality of the individual mandate.
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an assessable penalty" under the Internal Revenue
Code.·1·1 The court rejected this contention, holding
that "the individual mandate itself is not a tax, nor
is it intimately connected with the assessment or
collection of a tax."·1·1 In so doing, the court distinguished between a tax, which "is a pecuniary
burden laid upon individuals or property for tlw
purpose of supporting the Governmcnt,"15 and a
penalty, which "connotes a sanction or a punishment for an unlawful act or omission."16
In Jum"' the Sixth Circuit reached the sanw conclusion in Thomas Mon'. 17 The court noted that
Congress had called tlw Pxaction a penalty, not a
tax. 18 ThP court dealt in two ways with tlw fact that
the penalty was made assessable in the same manner as tax penalties. First, it found "the most natural
reading of the provision [to be that it] refers to th<.•
mechanisms the Internal Revenue Service employs
to enforce penalties, not to the bar against preenforcement challenges to taxes." 19 Second, the
court noted that the same provision denies the USl'
of some of the IRS's most potent collection tools
when the individual mandate penalty has not been
paid:10 Finally, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that tlw
purpose of the AJA would not be imperiled by
allowing the challenge to go forward. "Because tlw
minimum coverage provision does not come into
effect until 2014 (and the penalty could not bl'
assessed or collected until at least a year later), this
lawsuit will hardly interfere with the Government's
need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as
possible." 41
But the Fourth Circuit took a contrary view in
September in Liberty U11i11crsity. The district court in

31

Section 5000A(g)(l); s1•c section 667l(a) (dealing with assessment of tax penalties).
1
:t· Go11dy-R11d111um ''· HHS, 764 F. Supp.2d 684, 695 (M.D. Pa.
2011J, Doc 20"11-1639, 2lH1TNT17-18.
1· United Stall's v. Rtwgm1izl'd CFfr/ Fabricalio11s of U/11/i /11c.,
518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996).
%Goudy-Bae/mum, 764 F. Supp.2d at 695-696 (citing l~cor
xanized Cf['f'/, 518 U.S. at 224, and U11ill'd Stalt'S v. LnFnmrn, 282
U.S. 568, 572 (1931)).
17
Tlwmas Mori', 651 F.3d at 539-540.
18
Set' section SOOOA.
19
Tlwm11s Mon·, 651 F.3d at 540.
41
The PPACA provides that the IRS may not attempt to
collect the individual mandate penalty by placing liens on an
individual's property or by levying on his property. Nor m.1y
the IRS bring criminal charges for failure to pay the penalty.
Section 5000A(g)(2)(B). The only availablt.• collection options art•
deducting past-due penalties from future tax refunds and
bringing a collection suit. For a discussion of normal IRS
collection mechanisms, see David M. Richardson et al., Cil1i/ Tax
Proccd11rt', ch. 14 (2008).
41
Tlmmas Mort', 651 F.Jd at 540.

TAX NOTES, December 12, 2011

t

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

•

•

that case had rejected the government's AIA argument:12 The circuit court reversed. The court reasoned that the AIA should be constructed broadly,
that the "penalty versus tax" distinction is antiquated, that the substance of a measure controls
ovl\r its form and nomenclature in deciding
whether it is a tax, and that the individual mandate
enforcement provision has the substance of a tax: 0
A concurrence in Liberty University agreed with
the opinion of the court on the AIA issue.-1.i A
dissent disagreed.-t 5 The Goudy-Bacl111u111 district
court reconsidered its earlier position in light of the
Fourth Circuit's holding, but it reaffirmed its conclusion that the AIA does not apply.-'"
The action is not just in judicial opinions, however. Briefs and other filings by parties also hi:lve
been significant. The Fourth Circuit directed the
plaintiff-appellants and the defcndant-appellce to
file supplemental briefs on the AIA issue. They did
so in May. Both Liberty University and the DOJ
argued against the applicability of the AIA. The
university contended that the enforcement mechanism does not constitute a tax, that the act does not
bar constitutional challenges, and that the Willit1111s
Packing exception applies.-'7 The government maintained that the structure and legislative history of
the relevant statutes reveal the AIA to be nonapplicable:18 As noted above, however, the Fourth Circuit
rejected both the plaintiffs' arguments and the government's arguments. It held that the AIA does
indeed apply and thus reversed the district court's
decision.
Between the time the Liberty University supplementary briefs were filed and the time the Fourth
Circuit rendered its decision, another important
event occurred. In July two former IRS commissioners, Mortimer Caplin and Sheldon Cohen, filed an
,1mici curiae brief with the D.C. Circuit, arguing that
the /\IA and the DJA apply and prevent pre-

'~l.ibaJ_11 lluii 1., 7S.1 F. Supp.2d at 627-629 (concluding th.it the
individu,11 mandate L'nforcement provision is a regulMory pencilty, not'' tax for purposes of till' AIA).
11
1.i/la/t/ U11iu., 21111 WL .1lJh2lJl5, at *4-*14.
11
/i/. at·· 1n (Wynn, J., nincurring).
ir.ld. ,1t *2.1-*.15 (D,wis, J., dissL•nting).
'''(;011d11-H11d1111t111 u. Ill IS, 2011 WL 407287S, .1t *7 n.9 (M.D.
Pa. 2011),.Doc 2ffll-1%"3, 2011 TNT UW-17.
17
SupplernL•ntal 13ril'f of Appellants, l.ibcrty U11ii'. u. Cl'itl111cr,
2011 WL 2135094 (4th Cir. May JI, 2llll). In the other Virginia
GISL', the court found that the other judicial exception, the Smif/1
Carolina exception, applies, thus displacing the AIA. Vi1sini11,
702 F. Supp.2d at 604-60S.
18
Supplcmental 13ril'f nf Appl'llees, /.i/1crfy U11il1. i'. Ceitl111er,
2011 WL 21JS095 (4th Cir. Mav J l, 2011 ). The brid stated: "On
further reflection, .ind on co1;sideration of the decisions rendered thus far in the [PPACAJ litigation, the United States has
concluded that the IAIAJ doL•s not foreclosL• the exercise of
jurisdiction in these cases." Id . .it *2.
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enforcement judicial review of the individual mandate. They rejected the penalty versus tax
distinction, the "constitutional challenges are exempt from the prohibition" contention, and inferences from the structure of the PPACA and the tax
code. They argued that holding the AIA and the
OJA inapplicable would undermine effective tax
administration.-1 9
Most recently, a panel of the D.C. Circuit considered the issue. The majority acknowledged the
former commissioners' amid brief, but they reasoned that Congress did not intend "tax" in the AIA
to include levies that are labeled as penalties and
arc unrelated to revenue measures. 50 The lengthy
dissent, however, saw the AIA as more than an
inconvenient technicality and concluded that it bars
pre-l•nforcement review for some of the same structural, purposive, and precedential reasons as had
been persuasive to the Liberty University court. 5 '
III. Desirability of Amending the Statutes
Part II set out the numerous conflicting views on
the AIA issue. The majority of courts have held that
the /\IA and the OJA do not apply in this context,
and I agree that this is the better view of the issue.
Nonetheless, I believe that the /\IA issue should
be preempted through legislation rather than decided through litigation. Without preemptive legislation, (1) when the Court hears the AIA issue, there
is a less than 50 percent but still appreciable chance
that the Court will hold that the /\IA and the DJA
bar pre-enforcement review of challenges to the
individual mandate and (2) such a result would be
unacceptably harmful to the country. This risk
should not be taken. It can be avoided through easy
statutory changes.
A. Possibility the Acts Will Be Held to Apply
Given the DOJ's current position on the /\IA
issue, whichever individual mandate case(s) the
Supreme Court ultimately hears, the two sides will
dgree on thL' issue. But that will not prevent the
Suprl\nw Court from considering it and possibly
holding against both parties on the issul'.
The AIA issue goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of th<."' fr\dPral courts to hear this question. "'2

'''Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Mortimer Caplin ,md
Sheldon CohL•n in Support of Appellces .ind Affirmance, S1•t•ct1Skt/ t1. I/older, 2011WL2847595 (D.C. Cir. 2011) .
0
. " S1'l't't1-Skt/, 2011 WL S.178319, at *3.
"'Id. at *ll-42 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) .
2
-.. £.g., Tlwm11s A-fore, 651 F.3d at 539. Hu/ sec Patrick J. Smith,
"Is the Anti-lnjuction Act Jurisdictional?" "fox Notes, Nov. 28,
:Wt I, p. I043, Dor Wl/-22.H9, ur 20l1 TNT 229-7.
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Courts have an "independent obligation" to investigate the limits of their subject matter jurisdiction. 51
That obligation exists even if the parties overlook
the issue, fail to press it, or agree that jurisdiction
exists. 5-i A court's obligation to examine its subject
matter jurisdiction operates whenever that jurisdiction is "fairly in doubt," 55 as it is here.
It is for that reason that the Fourth Circuit
decided as it did in Liberty University despite the.
absence of disagreement among the parties regarding the AJA issue, and it is for that reason that the
Supreme Court allocated an hour of the upcoming
oral arguments to the AJA issue.
Most judges who have addressed the issue have
concluded that the AJA and the DJ A do not preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of the individual mandatc. 56 I believe that those judges arc
correct.57 So I hope that were the Supreme Court to
consider the AIA issue, it would embrace the majority view.
That result is hardly a foregone conclusion, however. The question is close enough that a genuine
chance exists that a majority of the justices would
take a view contrary to mine and to that of most
lower court judges to have addressed the issue. I
say this for three reasons.
First, such an outcome is far from unprecedented. The Supreme Court has often reached
results out of keeping with the majority view of the
lower courts. All of us no doubt can recall examples
of this. J content myself here with one example.
For decades it had been controversial whether
the reach of the federal tax lien is circumscribed by
state laws rendering tenancy-by-the-entirety interests exempt from attachment by creditors when
only one of the spouses is liable on the debt. A
nearly unbroken line of federal district court and

r:.:iE.;.:., Arbtms/1 v. YfrH Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
1
£.g., Hc11dm;o11 v. S'1i11seki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011); Sosna
z1• Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975). But see Helveri11s Z'. Daz1is, 301
!'1

U.S. 619, 639-640 (1937) (accepting an express waiver of the AIA
by thl• United States).
"'~Ashcroft v. I11bal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009).
. ll•J>rof.
.
Randy Barnett has been quoted as saying: "I think it's
highly significant that only two federal judges [the Fourth
Circuit panel majority in Uhaty Univasity] of all the 13 or so
federal judges who have looked at it have been persuaded [that
thl' AIA applies). That suggests it's a problematic argument."
St•1• Marie Sapiric, "Will the Anti-Injunction Act Apply to the
Individual Mandate?" 1i1x Noll's, Oct. 3, 2011, p. 17, Doc 201120b85, or 2011TNT190-1. The number of judges in both camps
has increased since this observation was made.
7
"' To fully develop the reasons for this belief would be a
lengthy undertaking and is beyond the scope of this report. If
the legislative changes proposed by this report are expeditiously
made, it will be unnecessary for anyone to fully elaborate his
position on the applicability of the AIA and the DJA in this
context.
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circuit court cases going back several generations
had held that the federal tax lien was so circumscribcd.58 Ind<.led, the IRS itself had so ruled several
times. 5'' Opinions on the issue differed within the
IRS, however, so the IRS continued to litigate it in
some cases. Eventually, the matter reached th<.'
Supreme Court. Overturning the long line of Iow<.'r
court cases, the Supreme Court held that the federal
tax lien does attach despite state law. 60
Second, the approach of the Supreme Court to
the AJA has varied over timt•. The Court has sometimes read the scopP of th<.' act's prohibition quilt>
broadly but at otlwr times has taken a narrowl'f
view of tlw act's sweep. 61 One cannot say with
certainty which spirit would animate the justicf's
when they hear challenges to the individua) mandate. This whole area is highly charged legally,
politically, and ideologically. Should one or more
justices wish to find a narrower ground of decision,
they might latch onto the AIA issue. That could
affect the outcome of the case given the widely
shared expectation that the vote of the justices will
be close.
Third, views expressed thus far show that the
question is close. 62 Those views include the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Liberty University, the amici
brief of two former IRS commissioners, the fact that

r:.sFor discussion of this issue, see Steve R. Johnson, "After

Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax Lien to the
Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests," 75 Ind. L./. 1163 (2000);
Stew R. Johnson, "Fog, Fairness, and the federal Fisc: Tenancyby-the-Entireties Interests and the Federal Tax Lien," 60 Mo. I ..
Rt>v. 839 (1998).
9
"' 5,.,. LJ11it1•d Statt>:; ''· Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 300 and n.9 (2002),
Doc 2002-9398, 2002 TNT 75-9 (Thomas, j., dissenting) (citing IRS
guidance documents on the issue).
<'°Id. at 282-289 (O'Connor, J., writing for the Court).
61
For instance, the Court sometimes has emphasized the
"sweeping krms" of the statute's "literal" language. E.s., A/1•.ra11da v. A111nic1111s U11itcd Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 760 (1974). Yet, as
noted in Part 11.B, s1111m, in Williams f>acki11g and South Caroli1111,
the Court created judicial exceptions not evident from thl·
statutl•'s literal language.
62
Scc, 1•.,c.;., Neil S. Siegl'I, quoted in Matthew Dalton and
Maril• Sapirie, "Supreme Court to Consider AIA's Applicability
to Healthcare Law," Tax Notes, Nov. 21, p. 935, Doc 2011-23896,
or 20rl TN'/' 22tJ-1. Let me quantify this in familiar terms. Whl·n
a tax professional renders an opinion on whether a given
position should be sustained, the comfort level of thl• opinion
writer will be expressed in one or another of a set of well-known
formulations. Se1•, t'.K., Robert P. Rothman, "Tax Opinion Practice," 64 ·111x um1. 301, 327 (2011) (quantifying tax opinion
confidence levels). I believe that were the Supreme Court to hear
the AIA issue, thl• chance that it would hold pre-enforcement
review to be precluded would meet a "realistic possibility of
success" standard but not a "more likely than not" standard. In
other words, I see the chance as over 33 percent but under 50
percent. Given the stakes described in Part Ill below, a 1-in-3
chance of derailing a decision on the merits is unacceptably
high.
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The individual mcindate doesn't go into effect
until 2014. The returns on which those who do not
have minimum coverage would have to report the
penalty would be their 2014 federal income tax
returns, which would be filed in 2015. One alternative would be for the individual to pay the penalty
in 2015 and then file a refund claim with the IRS
seeking return of the penalty on the ground of its
constitutional infirmity. Six months later (unless the
IRS earlier denied the refund claim)/"' the payer
could file a refund suit in either federal district
court or the Court of Federal Claims."5 The other
alternative would be to file a return reporting the
penalty but omitting payment of it. The individual
would wait for the government to file a suit to
collect the unpaid amount,"h and then defend the
suit on the ground that the provision is unconstitutional.

court level, followed by years at the Supreme Court
level. Realistically, it could be 2020 or later before a
Supreme Court decision.
Indeed, by behaving strategically, the government could delay a decision even longer, theoretically forever. Most Americans do not relish the
thought of tangling with the IRS, so most would
obtain the minimum coverage. Some of those who
don't would simply pay the penalty quietly. In
relative terms, therefore, there might not be that
many non-payers. Were the numbers small enough,
the IRS could simply grant their refund claims or
not refer the cases to the DOJ for prosecution. By
that expedient, there would be no cases to eventually bubble up to the Supreme Court. Thett scenario is unlikely but rnnnot be entirely discounted.
2. Harms. The longer the validity of the PPACA
remains unresolved, the greater the harms this
country will suffer. In urging the Supreme Court to
hear Florida, a business organization plaintiff in the
case spoke of the "harmful uncertainty currently
pcrvad[ing) the Nation" as to this issue and the
shcired need of both public officials and private
individuals for a decision that "will eliminate the
legislative contingency clouding their personal,
business, and regulatory decisionmaking."" 7 Specifically:
until this Court decides the extent to which the
[PPACA] survives, the entire Nation will remain mired in doubt, which imposes an enormous drag on our economy. Individuals,
employees, and States will lack a firm understanding of their rights and duties when planning their affairs. Providers of health
insurance will have no idea what rules will
govern their industry. Government officials
will not know what regulatory measures need
to be developed. Everyone will needlessly put
off significant decisions that may be affected
by the resolution of these contingcncies."8

Either way, there would be lengthy delay. Nothing could happen until 2014 returns were filed in
2015. Thereafter, there would be months of return
processing time followed by years for litigating at
the trial level, followed by Yl'e:us at the appellate

Among those "significant decisions" arc hiring
ck•cisions. It has been suggested that uncertainty
about employment costs associated with the
PPACA is a significant factor discouraging businesses from hiring additional workers."''

"'Bl•causl' till' govl'rnment ,1grees with pl.1intiffs on the AIA
issUl', thl• fX)j ,1lso suggested that the Supreml• Court consider
,1ppointing an amicus to file a bril'f taking the rnntrnry position
on thl• issue . .See Petition for Writ of Certiornri by State of Florida
et al., Florida v. HHS, 2011 WL 4500702, at JJ-34 and n.7.
"'.See section 6532(a)(I).
"r;Scction 7422(a); 28 U.S.C. section 1346; s1•1• Unilt'd .States v.
Cli11tlmod Elklzom Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, JO (2008), Doc 20088381, 2008 TNT 74-10 (confirming that the Ali\ does not
preclude refund suits).
"".S1•1• sections 5000A(g) and 7403(a).

Petition for Writ of Certiorari of National Fl•tfor,1tion of
Independent Husiness, National frd. tf i11dt•11mdmt Bus. l'. St'ht'li11s, 2011 WL 4479107, at *11 (Sept. 28, 2011 ).
''xld. at *ll-*12.
"''The prt•sident of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta said:
"Prominent among !the factors impl'ding hiring! is the lack of
clarity about the cost implications of the recent health care
legislation. We've frequently heard strong comments to the
effect of 'my company won't hire a single additional worker
until we know what health insurance costs are going to be."'
Dennis P. Lockhart, "Business Feedback on Today's Labor
(Footnote continued on next page.)

the DOJ originally took a position contrary to its
current position, and the conviction of the solicitor
general that the AIA issue has enough substance
that the Court should ask the parties to brief it. 6 3

B. Harm if On-the-Merits Decision Is Derailed
It would be a tragedy if the Court were to use the
AIA issue to avoid deciding the merits of challenges
to the individual mandate. It would take many
years for the constitutional challenges to the
PPACA to reach the Supreme Court through an
alternative route, and unacceptable damage would
be inflicted on the country during the period of that
delciy.
1. Delay. If the Supreme Court were to hold that the
AIA and the OJA bar hearing the merits of the
constitutional challenges to the PPACA now, when
next could the Court hear those merits? The merits
could reach the Court in either of the two ways, but
both would entail long delay.

•
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The self-interested statements of a litigant are of
coursl' subject to skepticism. Significantly, however,
courts havl' reached similar conclusions. As one
district court observed:
Responsible individuals, businesses, and states
will have to start making plans now or very
shortly to comply with the Act's various mandates. Individuals who an• presently insured
will have to confirm that their current plans
comply with thl"' Act's requirements and, if not,
takl' appropriate steps to comply; thl' uninsured will need to research available insurancr·
plans, find one that nwcts their needs, and begin budgeting accordingly; and employers and
stt-ltes will need to revamp their he<llthcare progrnms to ensure full compliance.7°
Other courts have exprt"'ssed similar views. 71
Given the stakes, delaying final resolution of the
legality of the PPACA would be highly disadvantageous.
IV. Amending the Statutes
There are three virtues thClt should commend to
policymakers the statutory amendments suggested
in this report: amendment would be simple, noncontroversial, and decisive. After developing these
points, this part considers, and rejects, possible
objections to the proposa I.
A. Simple
Two sentences of legislative language would
suffice to defuse the AIA issue. One sentence would
amend section 7421 (the AIA) to provide that it does
not apply to suits challenging the validity of th<.'
individual mandate provision of the PPACA. The
other sentence would correspondingly amend section 2201 (the OJA).
This would be purely ad hoc legislation, so it
would not have to be reflected in the United States
Code. 72 To take a parallel, the effective date and
transitional rules portions of session laws typically
are not codified.
If fears of unintended consequences rear their
heads, the sentences could be yet more circum-

Market" (Nov. 11, 2010), 1wt1ilafllc al http:/ /www.frbatlanta.org/
news/speeches/lockhart_111110.cfm; St't' also UBS Investment
Research (Sept. 19, 2011 ), at 1, 1mailablt' at http:/ /www.ubs.com/
investmentresearch ("arguably the biggest impediment to hiring (particularly hiring of less skilled workers) is healthcare
reform").
711
U.S. Citi::.t•11s Ass'11, 754 F. Supp.2d at 908.
71
£ ..i,:., Tlwmas Mew, 720 F. Supp.2d at 882; Virginia, 702 F.
Supg.2d at 607-608.
A duly enacted but uncodified session law, of course, is just
as legally binding as a duly enacted statute codified in the U.S.
Code.
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scribed. For exampl<', thl' sentences could be limited
to protecting only suits brought befon• a specified
date or pending in the courts as of a specified date.
Selection of the dat<.' would ensure that current
cases could procl'('d fwe of th<."' AIA and OJA specter
- which would provide enough vehicles for th<.•
Supreme Court to decid(' the merits of the indi. vidual mandat(' - without concern for what might
be in complaints not yet written. 7 ~

6

•

B. Uncontroversial
There appears to be no political force that would
opposl' taking tlw AIA and thl' OJA out of the
individual mandat<.' piclLm'. Tlw DOJ now agrees
with the shill' <lnd privatl' pl<lintiffs that tlw Supreme Court should resolvl' doubts about tlw validity of the PPACA. And, although it urges tlw
Supreme Court lo direct briefing of tlw AIA issut"',
OOJ has changed its view of that issue.
Assuming that the DOJ reflects the vi('WS of tlw
administrntion and its congressional allies, both
sides of the political aisk"' want Suprenw Court
review lo go forward. That being so, passage of tlw
amendments should be easy and without controversy. The <lmcndments could be attachl~d as riders
lo other bills or could be offered as free-standing
legislation. It would be heartening, in this gridlocked Congwss, to sc<.' something pass.
C. Decisive
Individual legislators could express their opinions on the AIA issu<.', of course, but that would
count for little. Post-enactment statements by legislators, even sponsors of the provisions at issue,
typically arc given littll' or no weight by the
courts.74 Legislation, however, would resolve the
question immediately and decisively.

f

D. Unobjectionable
I can think of no substantial objection to the
amendments proposed in this report. Four possible
objections aw considered below: effect on tax administration, separation of powers, retroactivity,
and adverse inference.
1. Tax administration. As noted previously, Caplan
and Cohen, in their amid brief to the D.C. Circuit,
argued that the AIA and the OJA should be held to
apply in the individut-11 mandate context. A contrary
holding, they feared, would undermine tax administration. 75

7
1Theoretically, such a pro\'ision could be challenged on due
process ground~. However, the easily satisfied rational basis
standard of review would apply, and the selective treatment
would be upheld.
74
£.g., Bread Political Actio11 Comm. l'. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 582

n.3 (1982).
75

Corrected Brief,

Sllf'rtl

n. 49, at *12-•13.
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Frankly, I doubt that the slope would be as
slippery as the former commissioners fear. I doubt
that a holding by the Supreme Court that the AIA
and the OJA do not apply in the individual mandate
context would metastasize into license for injunctions against routine tax administration.
Wherever the truth lies as to that, however, the
former commissioners' concerns about tax administration should not be grounds for concern about
the statutory amendments proposed in this report.
These amendments would be ad hoc and highly
targeted. By their terms, they would not apply in
the general tax context.
2. Separation of powers. When a legislature attempts to dictate to courts how they are to interpret
statutes, objections sometimes have been raised that
the separation of powers principle is traduced. 76
That should not be problematic for the amendments
proposed here. The amendments would not purport to tell courts how to interpret the AIA or the
OJA. Instead, they would change the substantive
content of the laws, which plainly is within the
purview of Congress.

•

••

3. Retroactivity. There has been some dispute about
precisely when a law change is retroactive and
when retroactivity is impcrmissible. 77 Amending
the AIA and the OJA to render them inapplicable to
suits already commenced would arguably be retroactive legislation.
That should not be a problem, however. First, the
Supreme Court typically has been quite indulgent
of retroactive tax legislation. 78 Second, rctroactivity
is most problematic when substantial reliance inter-

7''S1•c, 1•.g., Ez 111us l'. Stall', 872 A.2d 539, 5-12 (Del. 2005) (per
curiam) (holding unconstitutional such a state statute); Thomas
A. Bishop, "The Death and Reincarnation of Plain Meaning in
Connecticut," 41 Cmrn. L. lfrv. 825, 851-857 (2009); Johnson,
"Statutes Requiring Plain Meaning Interpretation," Sft1/1• "filx
Noll's, Sept. 14, 2009, p. 763, Doc 2009-19539.
77
For example, in 2010 Treasury amL•nded regulations under
sections 6501(e) ,md 6229(c)(2) to provide that overstatements of
basis can be within the six-year limitations period for .1ssessment. Among the objections raised by upponents of that change
is a claim that the amendment is impermissibly rL•troactive. The
government maintains that the amendment is not retroactive.
Sl't' Respondent's l{eply Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion to Vacate Order and Decision, l1111'rmor111/11i11 /11s11rrmo• Sl'm
of Vail /LC v. Commissiom•r, No. 25868-06, 2010 WL 6754789, at
f>t. 111 (May 6, 2010), Doc 2010-10163, 2010 TNT 88-12. ·The
Supreme Court has agreed to review a related case, so guidance
on this point may be forthcoming. Home Co11crl'll' fr S111111fy I.LC
l'. United Staft•s, 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011 ), Doc 2011-2674, 20JJ
TNT 26-7, t"t'r/. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3078 (Sept. 27, 2011), Doc
2011-17772, 2011 TNT 160-13 .
78
£.g., Unikd Stales v. Carf/011, 512 U.S. 26 (1494) (holding that
a retroactive tax law change did not violate the due process
clause).
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ests are at stake,79 which would not be the case here.
Third, who would object? Both sides want Supreme
Court review to go forward. Unlike subject matter
jurisdiction, retroactivity objections are waivable.
4. Adverse inference. Were the proposed amendments put forward and adopted, they would not
influence how the acts should be construed in other
cases; the amendments are targeted to one unique
area.
What if the proposed amendments were put
forward but were not adopted? Would the failure of
enactment be viewed by the Supreme Court as
evidence that Congress thinks that the acts do apply
in the individual mandate context? I doubt it. First,
the amendments should pass because they arc
uncontroversial. Second, for statutory interpretation purposes, the views of the enacting congresses
(the congresses that passed the acts) are the ones
that matter, not the views of subsequent congresst..'S,
which did not participate in the relevant "legislative
moment."so Third, the courts understand that there
are numerous reasons particular bills are not enacted, so they would not necessarily conclude that
the failure was because Congress disliked the contents of the bill. 81 No adverse inference need be
drawn.
V. Con cl us ion
If the amendments proposed in this report are
enacted, on-the-merits resolution by the Supreme
Court of the validity of the individual mandate will
not be derailed by the AIA issue. If they arc not
enacted, there is an appreciable chance that the
Supreme Court will not consider the merits until
2020 or later. The harms from eight years of delay
would be great. The risk is not worth taking.

7''S1•1• scw·mlly Mitchell Rogovin and Donald L. Korb, "The
Four R's Revisitl•d: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retro,1ctivity in the 21st Century: !\ View From Within," 46 01111- L.
l~ev. 323 (2008); Mitd1ell Rogovin, "Tlw Four R's: Rl•gulations,
l~ulings, Reliance, .ind Retroactivity: !\ View From Within," ·D
·fo.rl's 756 ( 1%5).
80
E.g., So11//i C11ro/i1111, 465 U.S. at 375; Hob Joni's U11iu., ..J 16 U.S.
.it 741-742; S1111da i'. Marks, 109 U.S. 184, 191 ( 1883). This
principle runs counll•r to the reenactment and inaction canons
of statutory interprl'tation, of course, but those canons <ire quite
Wl•,1k and usually amount to nwre judicial window dressing. S1•1•
sc11era/ly Johnson, "The Reenactment and Inaction DoctrinL•s in
State Tax Litigation," Stall' Tax Noles, Dec. 8, 2008, p. 661, Poe
2()08-24362.
81
Inertia, compl•ting time demands, .ind the sense that particular legislation is unnecessary may explain legislative failure
.is often as docs substantive disagreement. See, e.g., U11iled Sia/C's
u. Rodgers, -Joi U.S. h77, 703 n.31 (1983) (attaching no weight to
failure of enactment of a bill because Congress rejected the
measure "not necessarily because it disagreed with it, but more
likely because it found it superfluous").
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Cong ress shou ld <wai l itsel f o f the simpk., unrnntrovNsial, and decisive' c:i..p<•dicn t of amending tlw
Al/\ find tlw DJ/\ to n'ndcr thl'm in<1pp licabk tn the
current challenges to the \'alid ity of the individm1l
m anda l c.n~

In his disst•nl in the most n'ccn l ind ividual
mandak• circu it cou rt case, Judgr Brett Kitvarlilugh
a rgued at leng th tha t the /\ I/\ ba rs pre-en forcemen t
rcviC'vv. Bu t he add C'd, "Unl<'SS Congrcsc.; crcatt'S an
cxcc>pt inn for these Affordable Care /\ct casL'S wh ich Cong rt>ss cou ld s till do nt any atinw - thic.;
sui t cannot be dccid<'O by the ft'dcral co urts until
2015."1n C'ong n•ss should ncccpt thll l veiled in vi lHtion and span• the country pntcntir11ly many yt•ars
o f harmfu l uncl'rti'l inty." '

·"~Sli me ni.iy " ~'·:;~ the d1<1nce th.it the Supreme Court will
rl•,1ch the fc.ued re:.ult to bl' ill il lower lt>vt•I of probabili ty th<1 n
I do. In my \' il•w, g ive n tlw magni tu de of the pntvntiu l h,1 rm ~,
till' proposed <1ml'nd111e11t $ would b1· a wi~l' pr,•c,111tion ,11 t'l 'l'll
il 20 (WrCl'llt or JO pl'rCenl k'\'eJ of p rob:il>ili ty.
1"'i1•1w11-:ik1/, 20 11 W L 5:178'.l llJ, ,1t ' llJ. O f cour:.1•, .1~ 1wtpd
prL•v111usly, 2il l.5 wnu ld bl' the e.irli,.,.. t 11('!-"ibll' ~t.irt of a lak•r
round or lillg.1tion. II would not Cl>l tcl udl' 1111ti l )'l'Olr!> lhl· rc.1 ft e1
1
R· q. Ht!I• )one.' U11 h•.. 416 U.S. <1t 74'i (e111p h.1:.i7i11g thil t
Cu11g1:l'"-" j.., thl' pr.ipe r body for c rl.,1ting l'\fl'pli1111.., h• till' J\IA ).
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